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THE EXPANSION OF FAIR USE IN RESPONSE TO COPYRIGHT’S GROWING PROTECTION
John Burke
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of copyright is to balance the interests of authors and society as a
whole in order to reward authors while making their work available to society.1 The law
must carefully balance these interests since, “while the benefits of broad copyright
protection are concentrated in relatively few individuals and industries, the costs of that
protection are spread among all potential users of copyrighted works, which includes
nearly the entire population.2 Copyright scholarship has lamented a protectionist bias in
the law.3 In response to this perceived bias, some courts are increasingly using fair use as
a way to decrease protectionism.
Copyright protection is available to original works of authorship fixed in a
tangible medium of expression.4 Copyright owners are entitled to a number of exclusive
rights, including reproduction, creation of derivative works, distribution, and
performance.5 Violating any of these exclusive rights, including importing copies of the
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protected work, constitutes infringement. 6 The copyright act provides an exception
known as fair use for uses that otherwise might be considered infringement.7
The copyright act’s fair use provision provides for fair use for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.8 The statute also
provides four non-exhaustive factors to determine whether a particular use is a fair use. 9
The first factor to be considered is the character of the use, such as a commercial,
educational, or nonprofit use.10 Next, the nature of the underlying copyrighted work itself
should be considered. 11 The statute then requires a comparison of the “amount and
substantiality” of the underlying work that is used in relation to the underlying work as a
whole.12 Finally, the use’s effect on the underlying work’s value and potential market for
the work should be considered.13
Recent caselaw has shown that courts have begun to apply these factors more
liberally, and, as a result, courts have found uses fair rather than infringing. This trend is
a positive step in balancing society’s interests against an increasingly robust author’s
monopoly interest.

In fact, while it initially seems like the public’s benefit comes at a

cost to copyright holders, a liberal view of fair use could even benefit copyright holders
themselves indirectly.

Part II discusses the background and beginnings of fair use.

Part III examines the recent liberal view of fair use adopted by the Second Circuit and
spread to the Ninth Circuit. Part IV analyzes two existing arguments for a liberal view of
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fair use and analyzes how the recent decisions in Cariou v. Prince and Seltzer v. Green
Day, Inc. support them. Part V concludes.
PART II. BACKGROUND OF FAIR USE
This part discusses the beginnings of fair use, the initial fair use framework used
by the Second Circuit, and the Supreme Court’s treatment of fair use. This background
shows the initial, more protective approach that courts took that discouraged findings of
fair use.
A. Judicial Beginnings of Fair Use
The fair use doctrine can be traced back to some of the earliest infringement
cases; in Folsom v.

Marsh, the defendant published letters written by George

Washington in a biography and was sued in 1841 for infringement by the copyright
holder.14 In his decision, Judge Story touches on several factors that have since been used
by courts to determine whether a use is fair. Particularly, Judge Story notes some of the
factors that should be used to analyze the content of the use:
the question of piracy, often depend[s] upon a nice balance of the
comparative use made in one of the materials of the other the nature,
extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects of each work; and
the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to
the same common sources of information, or to have exercised the same
common diligence in the selection and arrangement of the materials.15
The potential economic impact of infringement has been a factor since the
beginnings of fair use, as Justice Story noted that the court must “look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the
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Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (CCD Mass. 1841).
Id. at 344 (quotation marks omitted).
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objects, of the original work.”16 Even in this early case in 1841 the court is concerned
with balancing factors including the nature of the use, the nature of the works in question,
and the possibility of the use superseding the original in the marketplace.
B. Initial Treatment of Fair Use by The Second Circuit
Initially, the Second Circuit adopted a very strong view of copyright and held
strict requirements for fair use in Rogers v. Koons. In 1992, Jeff Koons purchased a
postcard that featured Rogers’s print “Puppies,” depicting a couple holding puppies.17 He
took the postcard, tore off the copyright notice and gave it to one of his artisans and asked
them to copy it.18 Koons’s own written instructions include explicit directions to copy
Rogers’ print faithfully and accurately.19 The district court held that Koons use was not
fair and granted an injunction.20 After Koons failed to comply with the injunction and
turn over all infringing copies, the district court held him in contempt.21 Koons argued
that his use constituted a fair use, but the trial court found no genuine issues of material
fact and granted summary judgment.22
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that Koons’s copying
of original elements of creative expression in Rogers’ work was so blatantly apparent as
to not require a trial.23 The appellate court noted that direct evidence of Koons’s copying
was sufficient to uphold the district court’s summary judgment, but the court also noted
that Koons’s access to the work along with the substantial similarity of the two pieces
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would also be sufficient.24 The appellate court concluded that summary judgment was
granted properly.25
To determine whether Koons’s use was fair, the Second Circuit went through four
factors: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the underlying copyrighted
work, the amount and substantiality of the work used, and the effect of the use on the
market value of the original. In examining the first factor, the purpose and character of
the use, the appellate court noted that copies made for commercial or profit-making
purposes are presumptively unfair.26 The appellate court also noted that Koons’s conduct,
namely tearing off the copyright notice, suggested bad faith and militated against finding
fair use.27 The appellate court noted that Koons’s commercial purpose and exploitative
use weighed heavily against fair use, but that it was not controlling.28
In response, Koons argued that the primary purpose of his use of Rogers’s work
was for social commentary and is a parody of society at large. 29 The appellate court
defined a parody as “one artist, for comic effect or social commentary, closely imitat[ing]
the style of another artist and in so doing creat[ing] a new art work that makes ridiculous
the style and expression of the original.”30 The appellate court also noted that parodies
are allowed more leeway for more extensive use of the underlying work than the normal
substantial similarity test. 31 The Second Circuit noted that the Circuit adopted a
requirement that, while the work may satirize society at large, the underlying work itself
24
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must be at least part of the object of the parody.32 The appellate court stressed that this
rule is necessary to keep boundaries on the fair use defense. 33 “If an infringement of
copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the
infringer’s claim to a higher or different artistic use—without insuring public awareness
of the original work—there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense.”34
Ultimately, the appellate court found that the first factor weighed against Koons’s fair
use, and that there was no discernable parody of the underlying work itself.35
The appellate court noted that the second factor, the nature of the underlying
copyrighted work, includes consideration of whether the work is factual or fictional and
the creative, financial, or time investment put into the work.36 The appellate court found
that the second factor also weighed against a finding of fair use since Rogers’s work was
creative and imaginative and he stands to gain financially from it.37
The appellate court noted that the third factor, amount and substantiality of the
work used, requires emphasis on the expression in the original work rather than the
underlying facts.38 Additionally, the court noted that the quality of the copying is more
important than the quantity; copying that goes to the essence of the original, underlying
work weighs against fair use. 39 While parody normally affords a defendant greater
flexibility for copying, the court noted that Koons could not benefit since he did not meet
the requirements for parody.40 The court held that no reasonable jury could find Koons
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did not exceed a reasonable level of copying since he copied the very expression of
Rogers’s work.41
For the fourth factor, effect of the use on the market value of the original, the
court explained that the goal is to strike a balance between the benefit gained by the
copyright owner if the use is held unfair and the benefit gained by the public if the use is
held fair. 42 The goal is to encourage the copyright owners’ incentive to produce
copyrightable works.43 Therefore, non-commercial uses are less likely to harm the owner
than commercial uses, where likelihood of future harm is presumed.44 The court noted
that despite Koons developing a work in a different medium, Rogers needed only to
demonstrate that if the unauthorized use is widespread it could harm the potential market
for his original work. 45 The court also considered that, in addition to the market for
Rogers’s work itself, Koons’s work could harm the market for derivative works of
Rogers’s print.46 The appellate court found that the evidence supported only the view that
Koons created the work for a high-priced art piece and that the fourth factor weighed
against fair use.47
Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Koons
infringed and his use was not fair.48
C. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Fair Use
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of fair use,
affirming the use of the four factored analysis from Rogers v. Koons. Acuff-Rose filed
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id. at 312.
44
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 312.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 314.
42

7

an infringement suit against 2 Live Crew for their song “Pretty Woman.”49 The district
court granted summary judgment, but the appellate court reversed and held that there was
not a fair use since the song was commercial and borrowed too much from Roy Orbison’s
“Oh, Pretty Woman.”50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that commercial
character is not dispositive, but only a factor to be considered in the fair use elements. 51
Additionally, the Supreme Court emphasized the additional freedom for copying
afforded to parodies in a fair use analysis.52 In his opinion, Justice Souter stressed the
goal of copyright law “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 53 As a result,
Justice Souter emphasized the importance of avoiding rigid applications of the Copyright
Act in fair use analysis; the four factors should be weighed together with the purposes of
copyright in mind.54
In analyzing the first factor, Justice Souter explained that the analysis should
focus on whether the new work “supercedes the objects” of the underlying work or alters
it with new character or expression.55 According to Justice Souter, the first factor analysis
should center on whether the new work’s use of the original underlying work is
transformative.56 Transformative works further the goals of copyright to promote science
and arts, and the more transformative a work, the more likely a finding of fair use against
the other factors.57 A parody is one such transformative use, and a parody’s ability to use
existing works and expression rests on the fact that the new work at least partially

49

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994)
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Id.
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Id.
53
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Id. at 577.
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comments on the original, underlying work.58 Alleged parodies that fail to comment on
the original will have a difficult time surviving a fair use analysis: “If, on the contrary,
the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original
composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the
drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from
another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the
extent of its commerciality, loom larger.” 59 Justice Souter rejected 2 Live Crew’s
argument that any parody is presumptively fair use since there is no workable
presumption that could deal with each and every parody on a case-by-case basis.60 He
also noted that a commercial work does not lead to a presumption of unfair use and a
non-commercial or educational work does not lead to a presumption of fair use. 61
Overall, in examining the first factor, Justice Souter stressed the importance of a careful
analysis rather than a bright-line rule.62
For the second factor, Justice Souter noted that it primarily functions to focus on
works closer to the goals of copyright, namely creative works for public consumption,
and to afford less protection to factual works.63 Justice Souter also noted, however, that
this factor often would not be helpful for analyzing parodies since most focus on popular,
public creative works.64
For the third factor, Justice Souter explained that the extent of the copying in
relation to the purpose of the copying must be balanced along with the amount copied in
58
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relation to the whole underlying work.65 Justice Souter agreed with the appellate court’s
arguments that the quality and significance of the copying is just as, if not more,
important as the quantity of the copying.66 The appellate court was also correct in arguing
that whether copying was done substantially and verbatim is relevant since it can also
touch on the transformative nature of the first factor and the likelihood of market harm of
the fourth factor.67 For parodies particularly, however, Justice Souter noted that a parody
must be able to borrow enough from the original underlying work to be recognizable as
the object of the parody.68 While parodies by nature require more copying, once enough
characteristic features have been borrowed to conjure up the underlying work, the amount
of additional borrowing that is reasonable will depend on the first and fourth factors.69
For the fourth factor, Justice Souter rejected the appellate court’s application of a
presumption that commercial works lead to a likelihood of future harm. 70 Instead, his
opinion stresses considering not only the potential market harm to the original from this
copying but also the effect widespread copying of this sort would have and the harm to
the market for derivative works.71 Justice Souter stressed the importance of considering
parodies carefully, since many parodies may have the goal of destroying the original
work’s market and causing financial harm without actually supplanting it and creating a
cognizable infringement claim. 72 Therefore, the court must be mindful of its role “to

65
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distinguish between biting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright
infringement[, which] usurps it.”73
Finally, Justice Souter emphasized that the Court of Appeals erred by adopting a
presumption against commercial uses as unfair. 74 Such a presumption should not be
applied to any part of the fair use analysis.75 The Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell
emphasized a flexible approach to fair use that used the four-factor framework with the
goals of copyright in mind.

Justice Souter stressed that the four factors should not be

rigidly applied and was careful to correct the Court of Appeals’ presumption against
commercial uses.

The Court even declined to adopt a rule requiring that parodies

comment on the underlying work, instead only going as far as making it a single factor in
the overall analysis. The Campbell decision was carefully balanced and can be seen as a
step toward a less-protective, broader view of fair use.
PART III. THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS ADOPT A LIBERAL VIEW OF FAIR USE
The Second Circuit has developed and further expanded on the more liberal fair
use standard; and the Ninth Circuit has since adopted the same approach. The decisions
of both courts of appeals represent important guideposts for the ways in which the new
standard should be framed in the lower courts.
A. Koons Returns to the Second Circuit for a Different Result
Artist Jeff Koons created a series of paintings entitled “Easyfun-Ethereal” for
Deutsche Bank and Guggenheim in 2000 and again faced litigation. 76 In creating the
paintings, Koons used a number of images taken from advertisements and his own
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photographs.77 One of the pieces, “Niagara,” used a photograph from an issue on Allure
magazine taken by Andrea Blanch, an accomplished fashion photographer.78 Koons used
only the woman’s legs and feet from Blanch’s photograph and pasted them vertically
instead of slanting upward as in Blanch’s photograph.79 After seeing Koons’s “Niagara”
on display in the Guggenheim Museum in New York, Blanch filed a lawsuit for
copyright infringement; she later amended her complaint and added Deutsche Bank and
Guggenheim.80
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that
Koons’s use was fair.81 For the first factor, the district court decided that Koons’s use was
transformative and favored fair use.82 For the second factor, the district court determined
that Blanch’s copyrighted photograph was not creative, favoring fair use.83 For the third
factor, the district court determined that since the focus of Blanch’s work was used by
Koons, but the focus was not very original, the factor was neutral. 84 For the fourth factor,
the court determined that the market for Koons’s work was not served by Blanch’s
photograph.85 After analyzing each of the four factors, the district court granted summary
judgment for fair use since each factor was either neutral or favored fair use.86
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that the goal of copyright law is to further
creativity by rewarding it for benefiting the public.87 The court also noted, however, that

77
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fair use must strike a balance between the protection of original works and the interests of
other artists and the public in expression through referencing copyrighted works.88
For the first factor, the Second Circuit first looked at transformative uses, noting
that merely working in a different medium or context was not a transformative use: “[w]e
have declined to find a transformative use when the defendant has done no more than
find a new way to exploit the creative virtues of the original work.”89 Koons’s use of
Blanch’s work was not merely repackaging her expression. 90 “When, as here, the
copyrighted work is used as ‘raw material’ in the furtherance of distinct creative or
communicative objectives, the use is transformative.”91 The Second Circuit decided that
Koons’s use was transformative and perfectly fit the Supreme Court’s test for the first
factor in Campbell: whether the use adds some new expression to the original or merely
takes its place.92
Continuing under the first factor, the court also addressed the commercial nature
of Koons’s work; having found his use transformative, the court gave little weight to his
commercialism.93 The court also noted that, while Koons was paid for his work to be
displayed in the museum, the public also benefited greatly through the display of the
art. 94 The court also analyzed Koons’s work under the parody/satire lens; ultimately
deciding that his use was a justified satirical one.95 The court cited Koons’s own affidavit
to support his use of Blanch’s work for artistic reasons.96 The court also performed a bad
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faith analysis for Koons’s use, ultimately deciding that the only action he took close to
bad faith was using the photograph without asking for permission first. 97 Citing the
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit decided that Koons’s failure to ask or receive
permission is not bad faith so long as the use is otherwise fair.98 After going through the
transformative use, commercial, parody/satire, and bad faith sub-factors, the Second
Circuit held that the first fair use factor weighed strongly for Koons’s use as fair.99
For the second factor, the Second Circuit applied two primary considerations:
whether the underlying, copyrighted work is expressive or creative and whether the
underlying copyrighted work was published.100 The court determined that the fact that
Blanch published her photograph weighed in favor of Koons’s use. 101 Analyzing the
nature of Blanch’s work, however, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
conclusion that her work was “banal rather than creative.”102 Instead, the Second Circuit
found that Blanch’s work was creative, but that Koons’s transformative use commented
on her work’s meaning rather than borrowing its creativity. 103 Koons’s use was
transformative; therefore, the Second Circuit believed that the second factor had less
weight even if Blanch’s work was creative.104
For the third factor, the Second Circuit questioned whether Koons’s copying was
excessive given his purpose to incorporate existing images to comment on the world.105
Since Koons copied only the woman’s legs and feet rather than the whole image, the
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Second Circuit believed that Koons copied a reasonable amount given his purpose.106
Here again, however, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court, who believed
the third factor was neutral, and found that the third factor favored Koons.107
For the fourth factor, the Second Circuit noted that the market effect analysis must
focus on whether the use takes the place of the original work in its market rather than
whether it alters the market. 108 Additionally, the Second Circuit pointed out that the
market for derivative works is only examined for the types that would generally be
created or licensed by the copyright owner.109 Ultimately, the Second Circuit found the
fourth factor favored Koons, since Blanch admitted she never licensed her work and
Koons’s use had no effect on her career or the value of her work.110
The Second Circuit in Blanch upheld the district court’s finding of fair use for
Koons’s work, but they analyzed some of the factors differently to come to the same
result.111 The Second Circuit was careful to frame the factors differently than the district
court in order to stress the transformative nature of Koons’s use. While the district court
was inclined to view Koons as slavishly copying Blanch’s work without her permission,
the Second Circuit stressed the creativity in Koons’s work along with the fact that Blanch
would never have licensed her work or expected any revenue for this kind of use.
B. The Second Circuit Reinforces its Position on Fair Use
In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit continued the trend toward a broader
view of fair use away from a broader view of the monopoly for copyright holders. In that
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case, Patrick Cariou, a professional photographer, published a book of landscapes and
portraits he took while spending time with Rastafarians in Jamaica over the course of six
years, titled “Yes, Rasta.” 112 Richard Prince, a famous appropriation artist, created a
group of collages, “Canal Zone,” using thirty-five photographs torn out of “Yes,
Rasta.” 113 Prince eventually created a series of twenty-nine paintings, twenty-eight of
which included images taken from “Yes, Rasta.”114 Prince took the images and enlarged,
tinted, painted over, collaged, or cropped them.115 Prince also had a gallery exhibition in
Manhattan, and the gallery published a catalogue including the works.116 Cariou never
sold or licensed any of his photographs from “Yes, Rasta,” except for private sales.
Cariou testified, however, that he was negotiating with another Manhattan gallery, owned
by Christiane Celle, before Prince’s show.117 Prior to Prince’s exhibition, Celle planned
to give Cariou a large show, sell multiple prints, and reprint “Yes, Rasta” for a book
signing. 118 After Prince’s show, however, Celle cancelled Cariou’s exhibition and
testified that she did not want to be seen as unoriginal or riding Prince’s coattails.119
Before applying the fair use factors, the district court emphasized the goals of
copyright and the balance between protection and public interest. 120 For the first fair use
factor, the district court examined the purpose and character of Prince’s use under a
three-pronged analysis: transformative use, commerciality, and bad faith. 121 First, the
court emphasized and explained the purpose of transformative analysis. The goal is to
112
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determine whether the use adds new expression or merely takes the place of the original,
and, while transformative use is not required, a finding of transformative use will weigh
heavily in favor of fair use over the remaining factors.122 The defendants argued that the
use of copyrighted materials as raw materials for the creation of new appropriation works
is a per se fair use, much like the §107 illustrative uses like criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.123 The district court, however, declined to
adopt this position, and noted that the caselaw cited by the defendant required the use to
comment on the underlying work.124 Therefore, the court held that Prince’s works “are
transformative only to the extent that they comment on the Photos; to the extent they
merely recast, transform, or adapt the Photos, Prince’s Paintings are instead infringing
derivative works.”125 Though Prince intended to create new works, the court pointed to
his testimony as evidence that he did not intend for his use to be transformative.126 The
court believed that Prince did not intend to comment on the underlying work, Cariou
himself, or any cultural elements within the underlying work. 127 Ultimately, the court
decided that, while some of his works are more transformative than others, the
“transformative content of Prince’s paintings is minimal at best.”128
For the commerciality analysis under the first factor, the court began by noting
that commerciality will weigh more heavily against works that are not transformative.129
The gallery sold eight of Prince’s Canal Zone paintings for $10,480,000, of which Prince
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received 60 percent.130 Additionally, seven other paintings were exchanged for other art
valued between $6 and 8 million.131 The court also noted that Prince did not publicly
display the Canal Zone pieces anywhere else. 132 Ultimately, the court decided that
Prince’s use was substantially commercial and the transformative content was low;
therefore, the commerciality prong weighed against fair use.133
Continuing under the first factor, for bad faith analysis, the court noted that, while
relevant, it is not determinative.134 The court placed weight on the fact that Prince does
not approach using copyrighted and public domain source material differently.135 Also,
the court jumped on the fact that Cariou clearly owned the copyrighted material and
Prince contacted him to purchase more copies of “Yes, Rasta” the book but never to
license the work.136 Additionally, the court found that the gallery acted in bad faith by
exhibiting and profiting off Prince’s work with knowledge of his likely infringing
practices. 137 Having held that Prince’s work was minimally transformative, highly
commercial, and produced in bad faith, the court decided the first factor weighed against
fair use.
For the second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the court noted
that the inquiry should focus on whether the work contained creative or factual elements
rather than the artistic quality of the work. 138 The court held that the second factor
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weighed against fair use since Cariou’s photographs were creative and original and fell
within the core of copyright’s protection.139
For the third fair use factor, the court emphasized that the analysis should focus
on the amount of the underlying, copyrighted material that is used in relation to the
purpose of the use.140 If the used portion is the heart of the underlying work or nearly the
entire underlying work, this will generally weigh against fair use. 141 Having determined
that his work was minimally transformative, the court held Prince’s use was far greater
than necessary.142 Prince took the central figures of Cariou’s photographs, which were at
the heart of “Yes, Rasta.”143 Therefore, the third factor weighed against fair use.144
For the fourth fair use factor, the defendants argued that Cariou had not
aggressively marketed his work. The court found this argument highly unpersuasive and
noted that the copyright owner’s licensing or marketing efforts his or her decision and the
owner has the right to change his or her mind.145 The court found that Prince harmed the
market for both Cariou’s photographs and his ability to license them. 146 Cariou’s lost
museum exhibition is a clear, undisputed harm, and the court noted that unlicensed works
destroy the market for licensed derivative works. 147 Prince harmed the actual and
potential markets for Cariou’s work, along with his ability to license derivative works;
therefore, the court found the fourth factor weighed against fair use.148 Having carefully
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gone through each of the fair use factors, the district court decided that the purposes of
copyright are furthered by protecting Cariou’s work and finding Prince’s use unfair.149
On appeal, Prince argued that his use was transformative and fair and that the
district court applied the incorrect standard by requiring Prince’s use to comment on
Cariou’s underlying work.150 The Second Circuit agreed with Prince, found incorrect the
district court’s requirement that he comment on the underlying work, and held that
twenty-five of Prince’s works fairly used Cariou’s photographs.151
At the beginning of their analysis, the Second Circuit stressed that, while some
uses like parody or satire comment on the underlying copyrighted work, there is no
requirement that a use comment on the underlying, copyrighted work to be considered
transformative.152
For the first factor, the Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has held that
fair use requires only that a use alter the underlying work with “new expression, meaning,
or message.”153 The Second Circuit was convinced that all but five of Prince’s works
were transformative. 154 The court noted the differences in artistic style, medium,
composition, scale, and color between Prince and Cariou’s works.155 The district court
heavily emphasized Prince’s deposition testimony about his lack of a message and
disinterest in Cariou’s message or creating new meaning with his own work.156 Cariou
asked the Second Circuit to consider only Prince’s own perception of his works except
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for a parody or satire analysis.157 The Second Circuit declined to adopt any such rule and
found Prince’s testimony not dispositive.158 Instead, the Second Circuit focused on how
the new work appears to a reasonable observer rather than the artist’s statements. 159
“Prince’s work could be transformative even without commenting on Cariou’s work or
on culture, and even without Prince’s stated intention to do so.”160 The Second Circuit
found that the focus of fair use analysis should be on the works in question themselves.161
Analyzing the works themselves, the Second Circuit found that Prince’s uses have new
expression, new creative content, and new aesthetics.162 The Second Circuit was careful
to note that not all secondary uses are transformative simply because they modify the
original, but found that twenty-five of Prince’s works added new creative expression.163
The Second Circuit underlined the importance of avoiding presumptions against
commerciality. 164 Having found that Prince’s works are highly transformative, the
Second Circuit placed little weight on their commercial nature.165
For the second fair use factor, the Second Circuit agreed that Cariou’s work was
clearly creative and published. While this factor weighed against fair use, the Second
Circuit discounted it since Prince’s work was highly transformative.166
For the third fair use factor, the Second Circuit summarized the analysis as
“consider[ing] the proportion of the original work used, and not how much of the
157
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secondary work comprises the original.” 167 The Second Circuit noted that Prince took
different amounts of recognizable material from Cariou’s work in different paintings.168
The Second Circuit argued that using large portions of the original work is sometimes
necessary and that there is no rule that fair uses cannot take any more source material
than necessary. 169 While Prince used significant pieces of Cariou’s work, the Second
Circuit still favored Prince’s use as fair since it is so transformative.170
For the fourth statutory fair use factor, the Second Circuit focused on the
differences between Cariou and Prince’s works.171 Relying on language in Blanch and
Campbell, the Second Circuit narrowed the market effect analysis to “usurping” the
market for the original work and those derivative uses the copyright owner would create
or license.172 The Second Circuit focused on the different markets in which Cariou and
Prince present their work:173
Prince’s audience is very different from Cariou’s, and there is no evidence
that Prince’s work ever touched—much less usurped—either the primary
or derivative market for Cariou’s work. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that Cariou would ever develop or license secondary uses of his
work in the vein of Prince’s artworks.174
The Second Circuit seized on the fact that Cariou failed to market his works, having sold
only four prints, and Prince trades in a drastically different artistic world, exhibiting to a
variety of celebrities.175 Finding nothing in the record to suggest that Prince’s use alters
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the market for Cariou’s work at all, the Second Circuit found the fourth factor weighed in
favor of Prince’s use as fair.176
Having analyzed each of the factors, the Second Circuit heavily favored Prince’s
use since it was transformative. For five of the works, the court remanded the issue of
their transformative character to the district court.177
Judge Douglas A. Wallace authored a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part from the Second Circuit. 178 Lending his support to the changing
standard for fair use, Judge Wallace agreed that the district court’s requirement that the
secondary use comment on the underlying work was incorrect. 179 Judge Wallace,
however, would have remanded this case for the district court to consider the proper
standard. 180 Additionally, Judge Wallace disagreed with the majority’s disregard for
Prince’s own testimony in a transformative use analysis.181
C. The Ninth Circuit Adopts the Second Circuit Fair Use Standard
More recently, since the Second Circuit’s decision, the Ninth Circuit has
continued the trend toward adopting a transformative standard for fair use that favors a
broad view of acceptable fair uses. In Seltzer v. Green Day, Derek Seltzer brought
claims against the band Green Day for their use of an image of a screaming face, titled
“Scream Icon,” that Seltzer posted as street art and used to identify himself in
advertisements for his work and gallery shows.182 Roger Staub created a video backdrop

176

Id.
Id. at 711.
178
Id. at 712.
179
Id.
180
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712.
181
Id. at 713.
182
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16322 at *3 (9th Cir. Aug 7, 2013).
177

23

for each of the band Green Day’s songs for their tour, one of which included a large
version of “Scream Icon” with a red, spray-painted cross overlaid.183
For the first statutory fair use factor, the Ninth Circuit cited Campbell as the
definitive standard for transformative use: whether the new work adds new creative
expression or meaning.

184

The Ninth Circuit held that Green Day’s use was

transformative.185 While the “Scream Icon” is prominent, the video’s use is more than
“simply a quotation or a republication.” 186 The Circuit noted that the message of the
original “Scream Icon” was different from Green Day’s religious commentary; therefore,
the use constituted new creative expression and content.187 The Ninth Circuit summarized
non-transformative uses as characteristically “mak[ing] no alteration to the expressive
content or message of the original work.” 188 According to the Circuit Court, a
transformative use, by contrast, has apparent new expressive content or a new message,
regardless of whether any alterations were made to the underlying work. 189 The Ninth
Circuit downplayed the commercial nature of Green Day’s use by finding it incidental,
since it was never used to market anything.190
For the second factor, the Ninth Circuit held that “Scream Icon” is a creative
work, deserving strong protection.191 The Court found the fact that Seltzer had already
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widely disseminated his work favored fair use.192 Overall, the court found that the second
favored Seltzer slightly.193
For the third factor, the Ninth Circuit found Green Day qualitatively and
quantitatively copied significant amounts of “Scream Icon.”194 The court also found that
Green Day used an amount of “Scream Icon” necessary given their new expressive
purpose.195 Therefore, the court found that the third factor did not weigh against Green
Day.196
For the fourth factor, the Ninth Circuit noted that uses that serve a different
function and do not substitute themselves for the original work, fair use is favored.197
While the value of the “Scream Icon” was not altered by Green Day’s use, Seltzer
testified that it was damaged for him personally.198 Green Day argued that their use is
significantly different than Seltzer’s use and not a substitute for it.199 Additionally, there
was little evidence that Seltzer’s ability to license the “Scream Icon” was at all affected
by Green Day.200 Therefore, the fourth factor weighed in favor of Green Day’s use as
fair.201
The Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that Green Day’s use was fair, noting that the
majority of the case law is concerned with the first and fourth factors, both of which
weighed in favor of Green Day.202 The Ninth Circuit ultimately decided to continue the
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trend championed in the Second Circuit toward a broad view of fair use. The Court
found that Green Day took significant amounts of Seltzer’s “Scream Icon,” yet the Court
also found a fair use because Green Day used it differently and with different meaning
than Seltzer. Ultimately, this case shows how far fair use has come given that significant
copying can be fair use if the use is seen as creatively transformative.
PART IV. ANALYSIS
This part discusses the goals of copyright law, two existing arguments for a liberal
view of fair use, and the support for these arguments from the Cariou and Seltzer
decisions.
A. Increased Protection Does Not Further the Goals of Copyright
The trend away from protectionism in copyright law, highlighted by the Second
Circuit’s treatment of fair use in Prince v. Cariou, represents a positive trend toward
allowing more creative use of material that might previously have been seen as
infringement. The purpose of granting a monopoly through copyright law to an author is
to “inspire him or her to produce and to make the creations available to society, thereby
contributing to the constitutional goal of social progress through promotion of science
and the useful arts.”203 An overly protective view that gives robust rights to authors does
not further this goal, and copyright scholarship has lamented a protectionist bias in the
law.204 While it is important to give rights to authors of creative works in order to both
incentivize creation and support the authors, the other half of the balancing equation
cannot be forgotten. The goal of copyright law must be ultimately to promote science
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and the useful arts, and a narrow view of fair use that favors the copyright holder does not
do so.
B. Existing Criticism of the Expansion of Copyright Protection
In his article Symposium on Law in the Twentieth Century: One Hundred Years of
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, Robert Merges expressed concerns
about growing intellectual property legislation and pointed out two indicators for when
private interests have applied excessive influence on legislation.205 According to Merges,
consumers are likely to be harmed when the legislation focuses benefits on a small,
specific group and when costs are spread broadly over a long term and a large group.206
For example, Merges believes that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 demonstrates these two indicators: the term extension disproportionately benefits
those who already hold large or valuable copyright catalogues; and consumers as a whole
will be forced to pay for the term extension.207 Since the costs are spread so broadly, it is
unlikely that anyone will lobby against the Act; therefore, the resulting legislation is not
likely to reflect an appropriate balance of interests. 208 Since Congress has failed to
adequately balance the public interests when enacting legislation, courts should consider
whether industry groups were disproportionately represented when the statute was
drafted.209 Merges suggests that, while not determinative, a clear imbalance should tip the
scales in close cases. 210 Merges believes that the judiciary should use the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution itself as a counterweight to the influence of special
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interests over legislation. 211 Ultimately, Merges is concerned that the principle of
competition has given way to the principle that property rights are derived from labor;
courts are too eager to grant rights to any type of labor, stifling competition and
increasing property at the expense of the public.212
In her article Copyright on Steroids: In Search of an End to Overprotection,
Deborah Kemp argues that Copyright’s balance between the public’s benefit and the
author’s benefit currently weighs too heavily in favor of the author to the detriment of the
public.213 Kemp offers several reasons for the trend, including the impact of corporate
copyright holders on legislation and a mistaken belief that increased protection will lead
to increased incentive for innovation. 214 “Instead of promoting creativity, [Copyright]
laws now promote marketing.”215 Kemp also points out that the constitutional framers did
not view copyright as a property right as many do today; “[i]nstead, they considered it a
monopoly, what they referred to as a necessary evil, granted in a very limited manner
purely to provide incentive to the author to create.”216 Kemp believes that copyright’s
increasing protection results from this modern view that the value of a copyright is in its
ability to exclude others, which is a departure from the original intent of copyright. 217 As
a result of these mistaken rationales for copyright, Kemp believes that both courts and
Congress have hindered scientific and artistic progress by expanding copyright in three
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aspects: “length of protection, categories of works protected, and breadth of
protection.”218
This antiquated proprietary view of copyright comes from viewing copyright as a
traditional property synonymous with the right to exclude others. 219 Kemp believes that
this view of copyright as private property, through traditional property theories like those
of John Locke, is out of line with the way society and copyright owners often view art
and science.

220

Unlike land or physical property, “knowledge, aesthetics, and

entertainment are communications based and are meant to be shared, not exclusive to the
owner.” 221 The Constitution grants a right to exclude in order to promote artistic and
scientific progress, and Kemp argues that “[s]haring property is implicit in the purpose of
the protection.” Kemp also argues that modern economic concepts, namely the view that
sharing to benefit the group will ultimately benefit the individual, better reflect the
realities facing copyright owners than an antiquated exclusionary property view.222 Kemp
gives the following example of sharing and the realities of copyright:
For example, when an artist shares his music without copyright protection,
he is doing an immediate financial disservice to himself, . . . [b]ut the
sharing behavior will increase the number of consumers who have heard
of the artist, and they will attend the artist’s paid performances. The
benefit in the future is worth the economic costs in terms of current
return.223
Kemp also argues that the Internet has reversed the exclusionary property model, and that
rather than deriving value through exclusion, like in land ownership, value is now derived
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through “accessibility, or inclusivity.”224 Ultimately, Kemp believes that copyright law
must realign itself with this economic reality of sharing through legislation, judicial
interpretation, education and the social sciences, and encourage productive uses and
discourage litigation.225
C. The Second and Ninth Circuit’s Liberal Treatment of Fair Use Bolsters
Protectionist Criticism and Benefits the Public
The liberal treatment of fair use in both Cariou and Seltzer furthers the objectives
presented by Merges and Kemp of balancing the economic realities of the public’s
interest with the individual copyright holder’s interest.
Merges is particularly concerned with the balance between the benefits and costs
copyright bestows on the public and on copyright holders.226 In Seltzer, the Ninth Circuit
cites Judge Leval’s 1990 article in the Harvard Law Review, Toward a Fair Use
Standard,227 for his understanding of transformative use: “if the quoted matter is used as
raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new
insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine
intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”228 The court’s liberal treatment of the
transformative use doctrine allows more fair uses of copyrighted material operates to
restore the balance in Merges’s equation. A conservative, narrow view of transformative
uses, favoring robust and protective copyright standards, benefits the few copyright
holders at the expense of society as a whole. 229 Merges warned of the dangers of
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copyright law benefiting a select few copyright holders while the public bears the cost.230
Under a liberal view of transformative use, however, the public benefits from both the
availability of raw creative material for new creative uses and an increase in material
created through these transformative uses while a select few copyright holders bear the
cost of allowing others to transform their copyrighted material. In fact, the cost to the
copyright holder of the underlying work is an explicit inquiry in the fourth fair use factor:
the effect of the allegedly infringing use on the “potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”231 In Seltzer, the Ninth Circuit noted that, under the fourth factor,
when uses serve a different function and do not substitute themselves for the original
work, fair use is favored.232 Under a fair use inquiry, then, courts are actively using the
same balancing test as Merges and determining whether the cost to the individual
copyright holder is so great that it outweighs the benefit fair use bestows on the public.
Therefore, a liberal understanding of transformative uses can help counteract the
imbalance Merges finds in copyright law.
Furthermore, if one considers Kemp’s economic argument that the long-term
benefits of widespread sharing outweigh the short-term economic costs to copyright
holders, transformative uses are likely to end up benefitting even the copyright holder of
the underlying work in many cases.233 The short-term costs of allowing a transformative
use could possibly lead to a long-term benefit such as increased exposure or sales of the
underlying work or its creator. The Second Circuit in Cariou makes it a point to state the
differing markets for each work in their analysis of the fourth fair use factor: “Prince’s
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audience is very different from Cariou’s, and there is no evidence that Prince’s work ever
touched—much less usurped—either the primary or derivative market for Cariou’s
work.” But what about the possibility of Prince’s transformative use expanding the
market for Cariou’s work? It is certainly possible that Prince’s audience could seek out
Cariou’s work after seeing it used by Prince. In the long run, the immediately perceived
costs to Cariou could lead to greater long-term benefits than if Prince’s transformative
use was barred. Ultimately, a liberal treatment of fair use benefits society by promoting
creativity and making more raw creative material available for transformative uses with
little cost, if not some benefit, to a smaller group of copyright holders.
PART V. CONCLUSION
The evolution of fair use toward a broad, less-protective transformative use
standard furthers the goals of the Copyright Act.

The Supreme Court has noted

Copyright ought to serve the interests of the public: “Creative work is to be encouraged
and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.” 234 The goal in awarding a
limited monopoly through copyright is to benefit the public through the efforts of
copyright holders.235 “To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work.”236 A liberal view of fair use promotes these goals of copyright law.
The march toward a broad fair use standard balances the interests of the public and those
of the copyright holder toward the goals of copyright law.
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